In Long v. International Recovery Systems, Inc., 2012 WL 3597748 (W.D.Mo. 2012), Judge Maughmer held that an out-of-state debt collector placing debt collection calls to an in-state resident subjected itself of jurisdiction in that state.  Carl Leon Long sued International Recovery Systems, Inc. (“IRS, Inc.”), alleging that IRS, Inc. violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq., in that Long allegedly received telephone calls from representatives, employees and/or agents of IRS, Inc. who were attempting to collect an indebtedness that Long contends was discharged in a prior bankruptcy proceeding. IRS, a California Corporation, contended that Missouri did not have personal jurisdiction over it.  Judge Maughmer rejected the contention, holding that

Under this analysis, and accepting as true the allegation in Long’s complaint, IRS, Inc.—by directing calls to Long in the State of Missouri—“transacted business” in Missouri for purposes of the long-arm statute. In addition, because a violation of the FDCPA constitutes a breach of a legal duty, and debt collectors may be liable for damages and attorney fees, the acts alleged may be “torts committed in the State of Missouri” within the meaning of MO.REV.STAT. § 506.500.1(3). See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692b–1692h (imposing a series of behavioral obligations on debt collectors); 15 U.S.C. § 1692k (damages and attorney fees). Compare Vlasak v. Rapid Collection Sys., Inc. 962 F.Supp. 1096, 1100 (N.D.Ill.1997) (finding single alleged violation of the FDCPA analogous to the commission of a tortious act under the Illinois long-arm statute); Bailey v. Clegg, Brush & Assocs., Inc., 1991 WL 143461, op. at *2 (N.D.Ga.1991) (same under the Georgia long-arm statute). ¶  The Court rejects the contention of IRS, Inc. that it is not subject to personal jurisdiction in the State of Missouri on the facts before the Court. With regard to IRS, Inc.’s arguments regarding improper venue and improper service, it offers no additional reason for questioning the validity of either. For much the same reason that personal jurisdiction exists, venue for this case is proper in the Western District of Missouri. Moreover, inasmuch as IRS, Inc. was a foreign corporation without a registered agent in Missouri, Long properly served the company pursuant to MO.REV.STAT. § 351.594(2). ¶ . . . IRS, Inc. does not dispute that it made calls to Long while he was in the State of Missouri. The phone calls to Missouri, as alleged by Long’s complaint, are the very crux of his lawsuit, i.e . the telephone calls are the alleged wrongdoing. Under these circumstances, a finding of specific jurisdiction FN2 does not offend due process.