In Young v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 2012 WL 5508407 (E.D.Mo. 2012), Judge Fleissig held that a consumer need not plead that a CRA informed the furnisher of the dispute in order to state a FCRA claim.
Courts differ on whether a plaintiff must plead with certainty that notice was given by the CRA to the furnisher and the Eighth Circuit has not yet ruled on this issue. Compare Gonzalez–Bencon v. Doral Bank, 759 F.Supp.2d 229, 234 (D.P.R.2010) (requiring notice be specifically plead) with Ori v. Fifth Third Bank, 674 F.Supp.2d 1095, 1097–98 (E.D.Wis.2009) (finding notice need not be specifically plead). This Court finds the reasoning in Ori persuasive. In Ori, the plaintiff alleged that he notified CRAs of the credit dispute and that the furnisher of information failed to investigate. Id. at 1096–97. In holding these allegations sufficient to state a claim under the FCRA, the Court noted, “if a plaintiff alleges that he notified a CRA that he disputed reported information, he need not also allege that the CRA notified the furnisher of the disputed information because it would be unlikely that he would know whether this was so.” Id. at 1097 (citation omitted); see also Lee v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., No. 11–0633–CV–W–HFS, 2011 WL 5025877, at *2 (W.D.Mo. Oct. 21, 2011) (“Had plaintiffs alleged that they themselves notified a[CRA] of the dispute, further discovery might be in order.”). Here, Plaintiff sufficiently pleads that he notified two credit reporting agencies (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 14, Ex. A & Doc. No. 26 at ¶ 8), and that the CRAs notified Defendant (Doc. No. 1 at ¶ 15, ¶ 33) (“[b]oth Credit Reporting Bureaus indicated that the Defendant verified the tradeline as accurate.”). Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FCRA claims against it fails.
The Court also held that injunctive relief was not available under FCRA or the FDCPA.
Defendant correctly asserts that neither the FCRA nor the FDCPA permit a private cause of action for injunctive relief. See Young v. HSBC Mortg. Servs., Inc., No. 4:07CV646 HEA, 2007 WL 2083680, at *1 (E.D.Mo. July 13, 2007) (“It has been well settled that injunctive relief is not available to private plaintiffs under the FCRA.”); Weiss v. Regal Collections, 385 F.3d 337, 342 (3d Cir.2004) (holding that injunctive relief is unavailable to litigants acting in an individual capacity under the FDCPA). Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike as it relates to the request for injunctive relief is granted.
Finally, the Court confirmed that the FDCPA penalty was per person/per action.
Finally, Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s prayer for relief for statutory damages must be stricken insofar as he requests damages exceeding the statutory maximums. Statutory damages under the FCRA may not exceed $1,000 per consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n; Poehl v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 528 F.3d 1093, 1096 (8th Cir.2008). Similarly, damages under the FDCPA are limited to a maximum of $1,000 per person per action. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A); Reed v. Budzik & Dynia, LLC, No. 4:11–CV–865(CEJ), 2012 WL 2568140, at *2 (E.D.Mo. July 2, 2012). Therefore, Defendant’s motion to strike as it relates to Plaintiff’s request for statutory damages exceeding $1,000 for either the FCRA or the FDCPA claim is granted.