Accordingly, the District Court found that summary judgment in favor of the furnisher was appropriate.
Here, the summary judgment facts establish that plaintiff disputed Credit One’s report to Equifax that she was an authorized user on the Account. Plaintiff selected the dispute code “not her account” and recited in the narrative portion it was not her account so she could “only assume it was opened fraudulently” or “posted to my bureau in error.” Doc. 75-1 at 1. After Credit One received plaintiff’s dispute from Equifax, it investigated the matter by having one of its contract employees, Angela Andreas, review the ACDV form. And, that review determined that Credit One’s records were consistent with the information it had reported to Equifax. The Account’s application listed plaintiff as an authorized user. It provided the same address and birth date that plaintiff had provided on the ACDV form as her address and birth date. And, based on the substance of plaintiff’s dispute, Credit One had no reason to doubt the accuracy of its records. Indeed, plaintiff never used a dispute code for identity theft or fraud. She only asserted that she “assumed” the Account was openly fraudulently but she provided no other information that would have permitted Credit One to discern that plaintiff’s ex-husband had named her as an authorized user without her permission. She also never explicitly asserted that she was disputing the report based on fraud. Instead, plaintiff provided two reasons that she believed the account was “not her account”: (1) she assumed it was opened fraudulently; or (2) it was posted in error. The court concludes that no reasonable factfinder could find, based on the meager and equivocal information provided, that Credit One should have understood that plaintiff was asserting fraud. See Scheel-Baggs v. Bank of Am., 575 F. Supp. 2d 1031, 1040 (W.D. Wisc. 2008) (holding that the consumer’s use of the word “fraud” in isolation did not render a furnisher’s investigation unreasonable when the other information the consumer provided was “scant” and provided the furnisher “no reason to conduct a more thorough investigation”); see also Westra v. Credit Control of Pinellas, 409 F.3d 825, 827 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming summary judgment against an FCRA claim because the furnisher’s investigation was “reasonable given the scant information it received regarding the nature of [the consumer’s] dispute” and noting that had the consumer provided information “that the nature of the dispute concerned fraud, then perhaps a more thorough investigation would have been warranted” but “[g]iven the facts of [the] case, however, [the furnisher’s] verification of [the consumer’s] information was a reasonable procedure.” (emphasis added)). On these undisputed summary judgment facts, no reasonable jury could conclude that Credit One’s investigation of plaintiff’s dispute was an unreasonable one. Credit One employs procedures to investigate FCRA disputes. One of its contract employees reviewed plaintiff’s dispute. Credit One verified the accuracy of the information based on its records and the information plaintiff had provided in the ACDV form. And it confirmed plaintiff’s identification and listed her as an authorized user of the Account in its July 4, 2016 report to Equifax. By doing so, Credit One satisfied its obligations under FCRA section 1681s-2(b). For these reasons, the court grants summary judgment against plaintiff’s FCRA claim against Credit One.