In Cholly v. Uptain Group, Inc., 2015 WL 9315557, at *3 (N.D.Ill., 2015), Judge Gettlemen found that the bankruptcy laws’ automatic stay does not constitute revocation of consent under the TCPA.

Despite the fact that Count I of plaintiff’s complaint sufficiently states a claim for relief with respect to her non-consent allegations, in light of defendants’ motions to strike, the court also analyzes the legal sufficiency of plaintiff’s alternative claim that the bankruptcy stay revoked any consent she may have given. According to plaintiff, the automatic stay issued by the bankruptcy court in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding effectively revoked any consent she might have given to Alere to contact her. The Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) has held that “consumers may revoke consent in any manner that clearly expresses a desire not to receive further messages.” In re Rules Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 30 FCC Rcd 7961, 7996 ¶ 63 (2015) (F.C.C. 2015) (“FCC 2015 Rules”). Plaintiff argues that “any manner” includes notice sent by a bankruptcy court to a caller that an automatic stay is in place. The court rejects this interpretation of the FCC’s order. To begin, the FCC’s order provides that the consumer, not a third party, may revoke any prior consent that was given to the caller. Similar to In re Runyan, plaintiff may have, at best, implicitly revoked her consent. In re Runyan, 530 B.R. at 807 (holding that plaintiffs did not revoke consent by telling caller to direct calls to their lawyer). In addition, the section of the order plaintiff relies on is predominantly related to a caller’s inability to limit how the consumer may revoke consent.