In Skinner v. LVNV Funding, LLC., 2018 WL 319320, at *4 (N.D.Ill., 2018), Judge Aspen found that an FDCPA Plaintiff failed to make an evidentiary record that the Defendant’s principal purpose was the collection of debts, post-Henson.
The record lacks any evidence establishing the primary purpose of Defendant’s business, debt collection or otherwise. Plaintiff presents a list of hundreds of collection lawsuits Defendant filed in Cook County in July 2017 and offers proof that Defendant holds a collection agency license from the State of Illinois. (Compl. Ex. B, Pl.’s Resp. at 5, Pl.’s Mot. for Notice Ex. A.) While this evidence may establish Defendant’s business involves some debt collection, it provides no basis for establishing the percentage of Defendant’s operations that involve debt collection as compared to Defendant’s operations as a whole. Heller, 488 F. Supp. 2d at 692–93 (establishing the percentage of a business’ operations in collection efforts based on affidavits discussing the areas of work of the company, percentage of employee time spent on collection compared to other efforts, the distribution of employees in the company in different departments, the percentage of profits from each activity, and company financial records). Without any evidence of Defendant’s operations as a whole, Plaintiff has failed to establish specific facts needed to establish the portion of Defendant’s operations involve debt collection, a prerequisite to proving an entity’s principal purpose is debt collection under the FDCPA.. . .Mere conclusory statements claiming LVNV’s “sole purpose” and “raison d’être is the purchase and collection of defaulted debt” does not meet the required factual showing required at the summary judgment stage. . . .We thus agree with Defendant that Plaintiff’s allegations about Defendant’s status as a debt collector are “not supported by facts,” and find Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden on an essential element of her FDCPA claim. (Def.’s Resp. at 2 n.1.) Accordingly, we deny Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and grant Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Count I.