In Davidson v. Capital One, N.A., 2014 WL 6682532 (S.D.Fla. 2014), Judge Altonago found that a FCRA Plaintiff must prove inaccuracy in the credit reporting, even if a furnisher did not conduct an adequate re-investigation.

Capital One argues an FCRA plaintiff must establish the underlying information reported to the CRA is incorrect. (See Capital One Mot. 10). The Davidson Response does not seriously contest this point (see generally Davidson Resp), FN4 although certain portions could be read as arguing summary judgment can be avoided on the issue of the reasonableness of Capital One’s investigation alone. (See, e.g., id. 20 (arguing summary judgment is improper in part because “a trier of fact could conclude … that the investigation conducted by Capital One … was something less than ‘reasonable’ “ (alterations added))). ¶ Construed literally, the text of the FCRA would seem to impose liability—regardless of the accuracy of the underlying information—if the furnisher did not conduct a proper investigation after receiving notice of a dispute. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s–2(b) (1) (requiring a furnisher to “conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed information”); id. § 1681o (establishing civil liability for negligence “in failing to comply with any requirement imposed under this subchapter with respect to any consumer”). But to interpret the FCRA to create liability for the failure to conduct a reasona-ble investigation when the disputed information is accurate would do violence to the primary goal of the FCRA: to promote the accurate reporting of credit information to CRAs. See Chiang v. Verizon New England Inc., 595 F.3d 26, 37–38 (1st Cir.2010) (“The FCRA is intended to protect consumers against the compilation and dissemination of inaccurate credit information.” (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. MBNA Am. Bank, NA, 357 F.3d 426, 431 (4th Cir.2004) (noting Congress “creat[ed] a system intended to give consumers a means to dispute—and, ultimately, correct—inaccurate information on their credit reports” (alteration added; citations omitted)). As legislation should not be interpreted in a way “actually inconsistent with the policies underlying the statute,” Bailey v. USX Corp., 850 F.2d 1506, 1509 (11th Cir.1988), courts appear to agree an FCRA plaintiff must prove the challenged information is inaccurate. See, e.g., Chiang, 595 F.3d at 38 (requiring “a showing of actual inaccuracy in suits against furnishers”). ¶ . . . Relying on the undisputed facts, the Court de-ermines Capital One correctly reported the delinquent status of Davidson’s account to the CRAs. As such, Capital One has shown there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See FED. R. CIV. P 56(a). As Capital One has established its credit reporting in this matter was correct, Davidson obviously cannot prevail in his motion seeking partial summary judgment. (See Davidson Mot. 19 (“If Capital One had conducted a truly ‘reasonable’ credit investigation …, it would have certainly discovered its credit reporting was incorrect ….“ (alterations added))).