In Della Vecchia v. Ally Financial, 2018 WL 907045, at *1–2 (M.D.Fla., 2018), the District Court declined supplemental jurisdiction over a counter-claim filed by an automobile finance company against a TCPA Plaintiff.
In fact, the typical TCPA action presents a handful of discrete questions (for example, whether the plaintiff consented to a call and whether plaintiff revoked consent), and Ally identifies no “substantial factual [or] legal issue[ ]” that distinguishes Della Vecchia’s claim from the typical TCPA claim.1The counterclaims, which might devolve into a dispute about Ally’s compliance with the Florida law governing the repossession and the re-sale of a vehicle, likely will predominate over the TCPA claim. See, e.g., Ginwright, 2016 WL 5867443 at *5 (“[T]he more fact-intensive breach of contract counterclaim, which may involve analysis of whether [the defendant] followed state law requirements for repossession and resale, is likely to substantially predominate over the TCPA claim.”); Vernell v.Nuvell Cred. Co. LLC, 2016 WL 931104 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 11, 2016) (Chappell, J.). II. “Set-off”. 2 Although Section 1367 fails to confer jurisdiction over Ally’s counterclaims, Ally contends that the “defensive set-off exception” permits exercising jurisdiction over the counterclaims “despite the absence of another independent jurisdictional basis.”2 (Doc. 16 at 8) But the “federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and “possess only that power authorized by [the] Constitution and [federal] statute[s].” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Whether titled “counterclaims” or “defensive setoffs,” the counterclaims warrant dismissal for failure to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction.