In Sepehry-Fard v. MB Financial Services, 2015 WL 903364 (N.D.Cal. 2015), Judge Freeman found, among other things, that an auto finance company was not a racketeer because it securitized an in-pro-per Plaintiffs’ Retail Installment Sales Contract.
It is unclear what Plaintiff means when he alleges that Defendant faked the securitization of his loan. There are no facts alleged to suggest this type of fraud. To the extent that Plaintiff contends the securitization of his car loan rendered it unenforceable, that theory has been soundly rejected. See Hague v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. C11–02366 TEH, 2011 WL 6055759, at *6 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 6, 2011); Lane v. Vitek Real Estate Indus. Grp., 713 F.Supp.2d 1092, 1099 (E.D.Cal.2010); Mulato v. WMC Mortg. Corp., No. C 09–03443 CW, 2010 WL 1532276, at *2 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 16, 2010); Hafiz v. Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., 652 F.Supp.2d 1039, 1043 (N.D. Cal.2009); Benham v. Aurora Loan Servs., No. C–09–2059 SC, 2009 WL 2880232, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 1, 2009). As explained above, to the extent Plaintiff bases predicate acts upon Defendant’s alleged misrepresentation of its legal right to collect on Plaintiff’s car loan, that fraud is inadequately pled and not legally sound. Further, “[t]here is absolutely no legal support for plaintiff’s repeated claim that the failure of defendants to respond to various ‘facts on the record’ creates legally binding admissions.” DSNB, 2013 WL 6574774, at *8. Defendant’s other alleged acts do not constitute predicate acts establishing a pattern of racketeering activity, nor has Plaintiff alleged that those acts proximately caused him “concrete financial loss, and not mere injury to a valuable intangible property interest.” Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087 (9th Cir.2002). Furthermore, Plaintiff has failed to identify an enterprise that is separate and distinct from the person or entity that he seeks to hold liable under the RICO statute. See George v. Urban Settlement Servs., No. 13–CV–01819–PAB–KLM, 2014 WL 4854576 (D.Colo. Sept. 30, 2014). ¶ Courts routinely reject plaintiffs’ attempts to recast straightforward debt collection and foreclosure proceedings as a pattern of racketeering activity. See Hoang v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:13–CV–00582 EJD, 2013 WL 1436125, at *5 (N.D.Cal. Apr. 9, 2013); Zacharias v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12–06525 SC, 2013 WL 588757 (N.D.Cal.Feb.13, 2013). In a similar vein, the Court finds no plausible pattern of racketeering activity in Plaintiff’s allegations concerning Defendant’s straightforward collection activities with regard to the underlying automobile loan. As such, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiff’s civil RICO claims (Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth COAs).