In Lovejoy v. Bank of America, N.A., 2013 WL 3360898 (N.D.Cal. 2013), Judge Ryu found sections 1785.25(b)-(c) of the CCRAA to be pre-empted by FCRA, even though section 1785.25(a) was not.

 Plaintiffs argue that these sections not preempted because they are “informal remedies that compliment Section 1785.25(a),” which bars furnishers from re-porting incomplete or inaccurate information. (Pls.’ Opp’n 9–10.) The only support Plaintiffs cite for this argument is a footnote in Gorman. (Pls.’ Opp’n 10 (citing Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1173 n.35).) In Gorman, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the FCRA preempts the private enforcement provisions of the CCRAA, California Civil Code sections 1785.25(g) and 1785.31. Gorman, 584 F.3d at 1169–73. In con-cluding that it does not, the court noted that “the remedial provisions [sections 1785.25(g) and 1785.31] do not impose any ‘requirement[s] or prohibition[s]’ on furnishers of information …, and so the private enforcement provisions do not fall within the statute’s express preemption provision.” Id. at 1173 n.35, 1171 (sections 1785.25(g) and 1785.31 “merely provide a vehicle for private parties to enforce other sections, which do impose requirements and prohibitions.” (emphasis in original)). The Gorman court did not mention or discuss any other provisions of the CCRAA, and the court declines to read the footnote from Gorman as broadly as Plaintiffs urge. See Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 889 (cautioning that “Gorman holds only that the FCRA does not preempt section 1785.25(a) claims against furnishers.”). In fact, the Gorman court observed that section 1681t(b)(1)(F) “appears to preempt all state law claims based on a creditor’s responsibilities under Section 1681 s–2,” id. at 1166, implying that the FCRA preempts any state law violation that is based on conduct that section 1681 s–2 covers. See Subhani v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. C 12–01857 WHA, 2012 WL 1980416, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2012) (relying on this implication to conclude that claims based on state laws relating to activity covered by section 1681 s–2 were preempted).  Here, there is no dispute that Defendant is a person “who furnish[es] information to consumer reporting agencies,” and both of the provisions at issue impose requirements on furnishers of information to CRAs. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681t(b)(1)(F). Moreover, Plaintiffs’ claims under subsections (b) and (c) are each based on conduct covered by section 1681s–2. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681 s–2(a)(2), (3). Accordingly, the court concludes that subsections (b) and (c) are preempted by the FCRA. Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to those subsections are dismissed. See Harrold v. Experian Info. Solutions, Inc., No. C 12–02987 WHA, 2012 WL 4097708, at *3 (N.D.Cal. Sept. 17, 2012) (dismissing as preempted claims under subsections (b) and (c) of section 1785.25 “because they relate to the responsibilities of persons who furnish information to consumer reporting agencies.” (citing Carvalho, 629 F.3d at 889)).