As an initial matter, the court observes that Defendant devotes a substantial portion of its written opposition to arguments that are inapplicable to the instant motion. Defendant contends, for example, that “[t]here is no evidence that either Enagic USA or any Enagic distributor used an automated telephone dialing system … or recorded voice to place calls in violation of the … TCPA” and repeatedly asserts that “Plaintiff presents no evidence of a TCPA violation ….” (Opposition at 1:3–6, 24; 8:16–18 (“[D]espite having had over 2–years to obtain evidence that such robo or [auto-dialed] calls occurred, … the Plaintiff was not able to do so.”). A motion for class certification is not, however, a motion for summary judgment or a mini-trial. Ellis, 657 F.3d at 981, 983 n.8. Although the merits of a case may overlap with certification questions to some extent, this Court will only look to the merits “inasmuch as it must determine whether common questions exist, not to determine whether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims.” Id. Furthermore, Defendant’s arguments regarding the ascertainability and administrative feasibility of the proposed class (Opp. at 5–10) ignore binding Ninth Circuit authority. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly stated that “the language of Rule 23 neither provides nor implies that demonstrating an administratively feasible way to identify class members is a prerequisite to class certification, …” and declined to impose any such requirement. Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121, 1133 (9th Cir. 2017). Much of Defendant’s opposition, therefore, is simply inapt.