In Tietsworth v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 2009 WL 3320486 (N.D.Cal. 2009), Judge Fogel explained,
As a threshold matter, the parties disagree with respect to whether Plaintiffs’ UCL and CLRA claims are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). This issue was addressed by the Ninth Circuit in Kearns v. Ford Motor Co., 567 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir.2009), which reiterated that “Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standards apply to claims for violations of the CLRA and UCL” where such claims are based on a fraudulent course of conduct. Id. at 1124, citing Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d 1097, 1102-05 (9th Cir.2003). Although Plaintiffs argue that their UCL allegations do not rely upon allegations of fraudulent conduct, it appears that their claims are entirely dependent upon allegations that Defendants made misrepresentations, failed to disclose material facts, and concealed known information regarding the allegedly defective Electronic Control Boards. See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1126 (concluding that nondisclosure is a claim for misrepresentation in a cause of action for fraud and that it must be pled with particularity as such). Because Plaintiffs’ UCL claims are predicated on misrepresentations and omissions that are “grounded in fraud,” those claims are subject to the heightened pleading requirements of Rule 9(b). See Kearns, 567 F.3d at 1124; Vess, 317 F.3d at 1103-04.