In Cooper v. Atl. Credit & Fin., No. 2:18-cv-01254-JHE, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79011, at *15-16 (N.D. Ala. May 10, 2019), Judge England held that the FDCPA’s “catch-all” provision under 1692f has limitations where allegedly offending conduct is expressly permitted under another section of the FDCPA.

While Cooper cites a few cases standing for the proposition that certain conduct may state a claim under one or more provisions of the FDCPA, it does not follow that conduct that is expressly allowed under one provision of the FDCPA (§ 1692g(b)) is actionable under another (§ 1692f). The purpose of a catch-all provision is to address conduct that is not addressed under the enumerated provisions of a statute. Because § 1692g(b) specifically addresses permissible collection practices and communications during the validation period, Eleventh Circuit case law suggests that the same conduct held not actionable under §1692g(b) cannot a state a claim under § 1692f’s catch-all provision. See LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1200 & n.31. As this [*16]  Court has recently stated, “where both claims are based on the same facts, the failure to state a claim under [one section of the FDCPA] means that the plaintiff has also failed to state a claim under § 1692f.” Trichell v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., No. 4:18-cv-00132-ACA, 2018 WL 4184570, *5 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 31, 2018) (appeal pending); see also Miljkovic, 791 F.3d at 1308. Accordingly, Count II of the complaint is due to be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.