In Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Management, Inc.— Fed.Appx. —-, 2014 WL 4922451 (4th Cir. 2014), the 4th Circuit Court of Appeals found that a debt collector could not rely on the TCPA’s land-line/EBR exemption where the debtor was charged for the call.
The TCPA specifically prohibits “mak[ing] any call … using any [ATDS] or an artificial or prerecorded voice … to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other radio common carrier service, or any service for which the called party is charged for the call[.]” 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(A)(iii) (“call-charged provision”). We conclude that the call-charged provision’s plain language encompasses Monarch’s calls to Lynn. Cf. Osorio v. State Farm Bank, F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242, 1257–58 (11th Cir.2014). Moreover, we reject Monarch’s attempt to escape the clear breadth of the call-charged provision by relying on the FCC’s regulation excepting debt collectors from the TCPA’s separate prohibition on “call[s] to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message,” 47 U.S.C.A. § 227(b)(1)(B), and several rules of statutory interpretation. See United States ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 144 n. 6 (4th Cir.2014). Indeed, Congress’ purpose in enacting the TCPA advises against Monarch’s effort to limit its liability. See Clodfelter v. Republic of Sudan, 720 F .3d 199, 211 (4th Cir.2013); Broughman, 624 F.3d at 677; see also In the Matter of Rules and Regulations Implementing the Tel. Consumer Prot. Act of 1991, 18 FCC Rcd. 14041, 14092 (2003) (explaining Congress’ intent in enacting call-charged provision).