In determining the constitutionally permissible ratio of actual to punitive damages, the court may take into account actual harm which cannot be compensated for by an award of actual damages. Here, for example, the plaintiff suffered emotional distress when her employment was terminated and her employer told her she was fired for poor performance when the real reason was that she had been diagnosed with terminal cancer. However, plaintiff died before entry of judgment, so her heirs could not recover noneconomic damages. (CCP 377..34.) Nevertheless, the amount of emotional distress damages which would otherwise have been awarded to plaintiff was properly considered in determining the ratio of actual to punitive damages. At 3.5 to 1, that ratio was not constitutionally impermissible given the medium high level of reprehensibility shown by the defendant’s wrongful termination. The trial court also did not err in holding that the entity that acquired the defendant’s assets and carried on its business was an alter ego, liable for the defendant’s wrongful conduct–and also did not error in considering the alter ego’s assets in determining its ability to pay punitive damages.