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Nevada correctly allowed its citizen to sue California's Franchise Tax Board in Nevada state court, since it need not apply California law immunizing the Franchise Tax Board from such suits; but it was wrong to allow its citizen to collect more than $50,000 in damages from California's agency, when Nevada law prohibits damage awards in that amount against Nevada's own… Read More

Though exempt from federal income tax under 26 USC 529, an education or tuition trust is not designed or used for retirement purposes and so is not exempt from execution on a judgment under CCP 704.115.  Read More

Trustor conveyed real property to a revocable trust in 1985, and then created a new revocable trust in 2009; his 2009 trust instrument, which purported to transfer all of the 1985 trust’s property into the new trust, sufficed to perfect the conveyance without the need of a separate deed.  Read More

Defendant failed to introduce any substantial evidence that plaintiff, though a salesman of asbestos-containing insulation and refractory, was aware of its cancer-causing quality, as would have been required for defendant to assert the sophisticated user defense.  Read More

A badly drafted settlement agreement did not condition plaintiff’s right to receive the settlement funds on plaintiff’s prior discharge of medical liens on his claim.  Read More

The trial court erred in looking at a disputed e-mail's contents to help it decide whether the communication was privileged or whether the privilege was waived, since Evid. Code 915 forbids in camera review of prima facie privileged communications to decide privilege issues.  Read More

Plaintiff who took a medical leave of absence from her full-time job and, upon her return, was offered only part-time work, could not show that the employer's legitimate business reason for not offering full-time work was pretextual.  Read More

The bankruptcy court wrongly held a creditor in contempt where the creditor reasonably believed that its action in seeking an attorney fee award from the debtor in state court litigation did not violate the discharge injunction based on the Ybarra rule.  Read More

Sums received in settlement of borrower’s claims for improper construction are subject to the lien of the deed of trust encumbering the improperly built property and so must be paid to the lender, not the borrower’s bankruptcy trustee.  Read More

Though Cordray’s initial recess appointment to head the CFPB was invalid, his later regular appointment was proper and his later ratification of acts taken during the recess appointment period is sufficient to validate acts the CFPB took during that period.  Read More

An unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment for individual injunctive relief and the full amount of statutory damages for the named plaintiff does not moot out a putative class action even when backed by a deposit in court of the statutory damages.  Read More

A contract for a fee for alerting an owner to escheatable property is void as against public policy if entered into between the time a holder reports escheated property to the state and the date the holder transfers that property to the state.  Read More

In context of imposing a cramdown plan in the bankruptcy reorganization of a debtor who had obtained a HUD loan to build an affordable housing project, the bankruptcy court should have valued HUD’s claim as whatever the property would ordinarily be worth absent any restriction for use as affordable housing (even though the debtor ultimately intended to continue with the… Read More

A superior court’s branch with only one sitting judge is still part of a larger court with more than one authorized judge, so the normal rules setting the time for filing a 170.6 challenge apply, not CCP 170.6(a)(2) which sets a special rule for courts authorized to have only one judge.  Read More

Mandate was denied because it was not clear that the contractual forum selection clause applied to the claims plaintiff alleged and because the only harm petitioner would suffer by raising the issue on a normal post-judgment appeal was the cost of the trial proceedings.  Read More

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