California Appellate Tracker

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Plaintiff who took a medical leave of absence from her full-time job and, upon her return, was offered only part-time work, could not show that the employer's legitimate business reason for not offering full-time work was pretextual.  Read More

The bankruptcy court wrongly held a creditor in contempt where the creditor reasonably believed that its action in seeking an attorney fee award from the debtor in state court litigation did not violate the discharge injunction based on the Ybarra rule.  Read More

Sums received in settlement of borrower’s claims for improper construction are subject to the lien of the deed of trust encumbering the improperly built property and so must be paid to the lender, not the borrower’s bankruptcy trustee.  Read More

Though Cordray’s initial recess appointment to head the CFPB was invalid, his later regular appointment was proper and his later ratification of acts taken during the recess appointment period is sufficient to validate acts the CFPB took during that period.  Read More

An unaccepted Rule 68 offer of judgment for individual injunctive relief and the full amount of statutory damages for the named plaintiff does not moot out a putative class action even when backed by a deposit in court of the statutory damages.  Read More

A contract for a fee for alerting an owner to escheatable property is void as against public policy if entered into between the time a holder reports escheated property to the state and the date the holder transfers that property to the state.  Read More

In context of imposing a cramdown plan in the bankruptcy reorganization of a debtor who had obtained a HUD loan to build an affordable housing project, the bankruptcy court should have valued HUD’s claim as whatever the property would ordinarily be worth absent any restriction for use as affordable housing (even though the debtor ultimately intended to continue with the… Read More

A superior court’s branch with only one sitting judge is still part of a larger court with more than one authorized judge, so the normal rules setting the time for filing a 170.6 challenge apply, not CCP 170.6(a)(2) which sets a special rule for courts authorized to have only one judge.  Read More

Mandate was denied because it was not clear that the contractual forum selection clause applied to the claims plaintiff alleged and because the only harm petitioner would suffer by raising the issue on a normal post-judgment appeal was the cost of the trial proceedings.  Read More

A regulation banning conduct by California state university students that “threatens or endangers the health or safety of any person including intimidation and harassment” is not unconstitutionally overbroad or vague, because the words “threatens or endangers health or safety” give context and meaning to the prohibited “intimidation and harassment.”  Read More

A letter from a state-level fire department supervisor to a county-level fire supervisor asking that plaintiff not be assigned any duty that brought him on state fire department premises was not protected speech under the Anti-SLAPP statute, and in fact it breached a settlement agreement under which plaintiff had voluntarily resigned rather than face charges of sexual assault.  Read More

USC violated common law standards of fair procedure in disciplining Doe in connection with a group sexual encounter at a fraternity party, by giving him inadequate notice of the charges against him and denying him a fair hearing.  Read More

Bishop of Episcopalian diocese lacked authority to amend the canons of the corporation sole in whose name the diocese’s property was held, so transfers of diocese property which the bishop made pursuant to his purported amendments were invalid.  Read More

A completely uncooperative father’s appeal from a juvenile court order removing a child from his custody is dismissed under the appellate disentitlement doctrine.  Read More

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