After divorcing Yim, Lee filed this suit on behalf of her daughter Doe, claiming that Yim had sexually molested Doe.  Lee, a lawyer, sought to represent Doe in the action.  Held, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Lee.  Under current Rule of Professional Conduct 3.7, a lawyer cannot act as an advocate “at trial” in a case in which she is likely to be called as a witness unless about an uncontested issue, or about the nature and value of legal services, or with the client’s informed written consent.  But the comment to the rule clarifies that even when client consent is obtained, the court has discretion to disqualify the attorney-witness to prevent the trier of fact from being misled or to prevent prejudice to the opposing party.  Confusion can arise from the trier of fact’s inability to tell whether the attorney-witness is testifying from personal knowledge or merely explaining evidence as an advocate.  This decision holds that the rule’s use of “at trial” extends its terms to pretrial evidentiary hearings at which the lawyer may testify or which may reveal the lawyer’s dual role to the jury.  Here, the trial court correctly concluded that Lee would likely be a key witness on a variety of issues in the case and that Lee’s dual role was likely to mislead the jury and thus properly disqualified Lee as to trial, any pretrial hearing in which she would likely testify, and from taking or defending any deposition.  The trial court also properly disqualified Lee from all other aspects of the case on the ground that she would likely misuse privileged inter-spousal communications if allowed to represent Doe in this case.  She could not forget information learned in those communications, and as counsel for Doe she would be in a position to use them against Yim.