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The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that neither party prevailed or was entitled to an attorney fee award under the Davis-Stirling Act (Civ. Code 5975(e)) or the private attorney general statute (CCP 1021.5) in this suit by a condo owner against the condo association.  Although plaintiff obtained a preliminary injunction and prevailed in forcing the condo… Read More

The trial court properly determined, as a matter of law, that defendant attorneys lacked probable cause to file and to continue prosecuting an action by a mobilehome park resident against the park owner for interference with the resident's contract to sell her mobilehome to a third party.  The Mobilehome Residency Law at the time allowed park owners to require would-be… Read More

In this FEHA employment discrimination case, the court holds the employer's arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because (1) it required the employee to demand arbitration or complain to the employer within the time for filing an administrative complaint with the FEHC, whereas the statute of limitations on the claim would potentially extend two more years, one for the FEHC to… Read More

On an earlier appeal, the court held that the indemnity provision that the plaintiff required the defendant to sign in order to apply for approval of its development project was not supported by consideration and that plaintiff had no statutory authority to impose an indemnity agreement as a condition of plaintiff's statutory duty to consider defendant's application.  On this appeal,… Read More

Following David S. Karton, A Law Corp. v. Dougherty (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 600, this decision holds that when a defendant pays a default judgment entered against him before successfully moving to vacate the default judgment (and hence before filing an answer), Civ. Code 1717(b)(2) applies, making the defendant the prevailing party for purposes of a fee award if the plaintiff… Read More

Ordinarily, an order on a motion for an attorney fee award is appealable as a post-judgment order under CCP 904.1(a)(2).  But here, to maintain the trial court's jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement, the parties agreed that judgment would not be entered dismissing the action until after defendant had paid the settlement amount and any attorney fees awarded by the… Read More

A defendant that files an Anti-SLAPP motion to strike under CCP 425.16 may seek attorney fees (based on prevailing on the Anti-SLAPP motion) in one of three ways:  as part of the Anti-SLAPP motion, by a post-judgment memorandum of costs, or by a post-judgment motion for an attorney fee award.  This decision holds that if the defendant chooses either of… Read More

Following Duale v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 718, this decision holds that a valid and reasonable section 998 offer by the seller, where the buyer recovers less than the offer, precludes recovery by the buyer of post-offer attorneys’ fees and costs under Code of Civil Procedure section 1794(d) of the Song-Beverly Warranty Act claim.  Here, the defendant's initial… Read More

A district court may approve a class action settlement that provides monetary relief only in the form of cy pres payments to non-parties, so long as distribution to class members is not possible and the recipients of the cy pres payments are appropriately chosen in light of the nature of the plaintiffs’ lawsuit, the objectives of the underlying statutes, and… Read More

A breach of contract is not "wrongful conduct" sufficient to support a claim for interference with prospective economic relationships.  Here, plaintiff narrowed its claim to interference based on the defendant's breach of a nondisclosure agreement.  Held, the trial court erred in submitting that claim to the jury since it was the court's responsibility to determine whether the alleged conduct was… Read More

Plaintiff recovered a $115,000 jury verdict after having rejected defendant's $200,000 998 offer.  This decision holds that the defendant's post-offer costs awarded by the trial court under CCP 998 must be subtracted from the $115,000 jury verdict before computing the amount of the judgment payable to the workers' comp. lienor under Lab. Code 3856.  Since the post-offer costs exceeded $115,000,… Read More

This opinion affirms the trial court's denial of attorney fees sought by plaintiff in long-running litigation between the two parties.  Plaintiff recovered $38,0000 in the original proceeding.  It waited more than a year after the remittitur issued ending the appeal from that judgment before filing a separate action to enforce the judgment against the supersedeas bond that defendant had posted… Read More

Plaintiff attorney was hired by defendant as an in-house attorney, but his compensation was dependent, in part, on the outcome of a large bit of litigation in which the defendant was engaged.  This decision holds that plaintiff's agreement was a contingency fee agreement which was unenforceable because not written and signed by both parties as required by B&P Code 6147. … Read More

Deciding an issue left open in Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, this decision holds that a plaintiff who is an attorney but represents only himself cannot recover attorney fees under a common fund theory of attorney fee recovery since he does not pay or incur liability for any attorney fees.  However, such a plaintiff is entitled to recover… Read More

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